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Abstract 
This paper contributes to the banking literature by investigating the moderating effects of two sources of the 
monitoring board (board size and independent outside directors) on the relationship between tax planning and 
bank performance. We propose that these monitors can affect either the form or the strength of the relationship 
between tax planning and performance. Our empirical investigation uses a sample of 18 Tunisian banks during 
the period 2000-2011 and various statistical tools including panel data techniques. Results showed that while 
board size moderate the form of the tax planning-performance relationship, independent outside directors 
influence the strength of that relationship. Its findings have direct policy relevance for investors and tax 
administrations in monitoring and controlling banks' tax planning activities.   
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1. Introduction 
Previous research works have explained the variations in tax burdens in terms of firm level characteristics 
(Gupta & Newberry 1997; Holland 1998). It has only been recently that their attention has turned to 
understanding the underlying motivations for these variations and any potential equity valuation consequences 
(Abdul Wahab & Holland 2012). Tax planning is considered one of the means of motivations for these variations. 
It is defined as the downward management of taxable income through tax planning activities (Frank et al. 2009; 
Chen et al. 2010). Tax planning represents a significant cost to the firm and shareholders. Although, the tax 
reduction can entail an increase of after-tax profits. There are actual and potential costs that inhibit firms from 
maximizing after-tax profits through tax planning. However, non-tax costs can be generated and accompanied by 
tax planning activities, particularly those arising from agency problems. Thus, the shareholders have to control 
the managers on the decision taken in fiscal subject. In fact, Swenson (1999) provides evidence of a negative 
relationship between the Effective Tax Rates (ETRs) and the share price. In the same context, Slemrod (2004) 
suggests linking manager’s compensation to desirable outcomes such as ETR. 
Governance can play the role of mediator between tax planning and banking performance. In particular, internal 
governance considers the board of directors as the main vehicle to exercise an actual control over the 
management, such as the rules which require a board dominated by external directors. Therefore, the board 
becomes a key mechanism to monitor managers’ behavior and to advise them on the identification and the 
implementation of the strategy. In this context, Andres & Vallelado (2008) examined the effect of board of 
directors on banking performance. They found that bank board composition and size are related to directors’ 
ability to monitor and advise management.  Thus, the inclusion of more directors should benefit the monitoring 
and advisory functions, improve governance, and raise returns.  
 
Similarly, Pathan & Skully (2010) examine the trends and endogenous determinants of boards of directors: board 
size, composition and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) duality. They found that the costs and benefits of boards’ 
monitoring and advising roles could explain bank board structures with caveats. They also found that in contrast 
to non-bank evidence, for instance, board size was discovered to decrease over the sample period for large and 
medium-sized banks, while board size remained relatively stable for small banks. 
In the same context, Belkhir (2009) investigated the relationship between board size and performance. Contrary 
to theories predicting that smaller boards of directors are more effective, increasing the number of directors in 
banking firms does not undermine performance. In contrast, the evidence is in favor of a positive relationship 
between board size and performance, as measured by Tobin’s Q and the Return on Assets. He found that the 
number of directors leaving the board and the number of those joining the board for the first time increase 
following a poor performance, but the net change in board size is not affected by past performance. 
In the same spirit, Pathan & Faff (2013) found that both board size and independent directors decrease bank 
performance. They show that board structure is particularly relevant for banks with low market power. The 
diversity of board of directors can affect banking performance. Pathan & Faff (2013) found that although gender 
diversity improves the performance of the bank for the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley (1997-2002), the positive effect of 
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sex decreases both after the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley (2003-2006) and during periods of crisis (2007-
2011). 
Shareholders will want a board of directors that will advise managers to undertake risky investments. The 
composition of the board of directors should be a reliable proxy of how well the board can process information 
provided by insiders and advise as well as monitor the bank’s risk taking practices in the best interests of its 
shareholders. Minton et al. (2011) examined how board independence and the percentage of financial experts 
among independent directors relate to risk taking and performance of commercial banks during the period from 
2003 to 2008, which includes the most recent financial crisis. They found that larger and more independent 
boards are associated with lower levels of risk taking. Thus the level of financial expertise among independent 
directors is positively related to risk taking both before and during the financial crisis. They show that during the 
crisis both stock performance and changes in firm value are worse for large banks with more financial expertise 
among its independent directors. 
Furthermore, board of directors affects tax planning. Lanis & Richardson (2011) show that the inclusion of a 
higher proportion of outside members on the board of directors reduces the likelihood of tax aggressiveness. 
They also found a negative and statistically significant association between outside board of director 
membership and tax aggressiveness. Thus, more independent boards appear to deter tax aggressiveness through 
better governance. In the same framework, Lanis & Richardson (2012) examined the association between 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and corporate tax aggressiveness. They found a negative and statistically 
significant association between CSR disclosure and tax aggressiveness which holds across a number of different 
regression model specifications, thus most socially responsible corporations are likely to be less tax aggressive in 
nature.  They also found that the social investment commitment and corporate and CSR strategy (including the 
ethics and business conduct) of a corporation are important elements of CSR activities that have a negative 
impact on tax aggressiveness. Recently, Lanis et al. (2013) have shown that the interaction between the 
composition of the board and the establishment of an effective system of risk management effect and internal 
controls can jointly reduce tax aggressiveness.  
Based on the foregoing, we note firstly that the research works mentioned above have examined the effect of 
corporate governance on the tax planning (Desai & Dharmapala 2006; Hanlon & Slemrod 2009). Secondly, other 
studies have examined only the effect of governance on bank performance. So governance can play the role of 
moderator between tax planning and bank performance. Knowing that no study has been made in this direction, 
then our hypothesis is: governance (board of directors) may moderate the relationship between tax planning and 
bank performance. 
This study makes several important contributions. Firstly, against a backdrop of increased attention on Tunisian 
bank’s tax planning, it provides the first evidence concerning the potential moderating effects of corporate 
governance factors on the relationship between tax planning and bank performance. Secondly, the analysis is 
conducted by using a longitudinal period of twelve years thereby recognizing that the tax planning activities may 
vary over time. 
The next section of the paper discusses the sample and data source and is followed by sections on variables for 
research design, models specification, results and finally the conclusion. 
2. Sample and Data 
The paper employs a panel dataset of financial firms listed on the Tunisian Stock Exchange in the beginning of 
2013, during the period 2000-2011. As the nature of tax planning activities may depend on firm’s consistently 
profitable (Mills et al. 1998), the sample is limited to firms that were profitable in all reporting years. This 
restriction resulted in the exclusion of 5 non-persistent firms. To provide a more representative analysis, a filter 
is used to exclude firms with extreme ETRs. Outlying observations were defined with an ETR>1 (Abdul Wahab 
& Holland 2012). In order to maintain a balanced panel by necessity 45 year end observations were excluded. 
Table 1 presents the sample selection process which resulted in 18 financial firms to give a balanced panel of 216 
year end observations overs the reporting period. 
Table 1. Sample Selection Process 




Finance listed companies in the beginning of 2013  24 
Companies not exist throughout the period  (1) 
 276 23 
Negative pre-tax profit (14)  
Extreme value of effective tax rates (ETR>1) (1)  
Unbalance data (45)  
Sample 216 18 
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The data have been collected with reference to the financial statement obtained from the Tunisian Financial 
Market Council. Board of director’s data was obtained from stock guides published by the Tunisian Stock 
Exchange with supplemental data collected from firm’s websites.  
3. Variables for Research Design 
3.1 Measurement of Variables 
The empirical analysis in this paper is based on models that explain bank performance as a function of tax 
planning, board structures and a series of control variables. Bank performance, the dependent variable that we 
are examining, is measured by the Return on Assets ratio (ROA). It is calculated as the net income divided by the 
total assets. This ratio is the most used ratio to integrate accounting based performance as proxies for firm 
performance (Lam & Lee 2008; Abdullah 2004). 
The independent variable of main interest is the tax planning. The measure used is defined as the percentage of 
total tax expense to pretax income. This measure reflects aggressive tax planning through permanent book-tax 
differences. Examples of such tax planning are investments in tax havens with lower foreign tax rates (provided 
that foreign source earnings are classified as permanently reinvested), investment in tax exempt or tax favored 
assets, and participation in tax shelters that gives rise to losses for tax purposes but not for book purposes 
(Wilson 2009). We draw on ETR in this study for two important reasons. Firstly, recent empirical tax research 
has found that ETR encapsulate tax planning (Armstrong et al. 2012). Secondly, ETRs also denote the proxy 
measure of tax planning most frequently used by many academic researchers (Robinson et al. 2010; Dyreng et al. 
2008). 
The two measures considered of board structures represent board size (BS) and independent outside directors 
(INDEP). BS is the number of directors on the board. INDEP is the percentage of total directors that are outside. 
An independent outside director is one whose only business relationship with the bank is his or her directorship. 
An independent outside director is not an existing or former employee of the bank and does not have any 
significant business/ familial ties with the bank (Charreaux 1997).  
In line with literature on bank risk and performance, this paper controls for several firm specific characteristics. 
Firstly, the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets is used as a measure of bank size (SIZE). Anderson 
& Fraser (2000) showed that larger banks are more capable of diversifying risk, both geographically and by 
industry, than small banks. Moreover, larger banks have greater access to capital markets and thus more ability to 
adjust to unexpected liquidity and capital shortfalls. Secondly, the bank capital ratio (CAPITAL) is measured as 
bank total equity as a percentage of the bank’s total assets. Cornett et al. (2009) found that capital is negatively 
related to earnings management. Thus, banks with high levels of income and capital record more loan losses and 
fewer securities gains. Pathan & Faff (2013) stipulate that statistically significant and positive coefficients on 
CAPITAL indicate that highly capitalized banks perform better. Thirdly, net interest margin (NIM) is calculated 
as net interest income as a percentage of average earnings assets. Net interest income is the difference between 
interest income and interest expense. Angbazo (1997) showed that the NIMs of money-center banks are affected 
by default risk, but not by interest-rate risk, which is consistent with their greater concentration in short-term 
assets and Off-balance Sheet (OBS) hedging instruments. By contrast, (super-) regional banking firms are 
sensitive to interest-rate risk but not to default risk. The data show that OBS activities promote a more 
diversified, margins-generating asset base than deposit- or equity-financing, and that cross-sectional differences 
in interest-rate risk and liquidity risk are related to differences in OBS exposure. 
3.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 displays a summary of definition of variables and descriptive statistics for the sample firms.  
Table 2. Variables, Definitions, and Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Symbol Measurement Mean SD 
Bank 
performance ROA (%) Percentage of net income to total assets 3.5256 5.2793 
Effective tax rate ETR (%) Percentage of tax charge to profit before tax 15.6204 9.6009 
Bank size SIZE Natural logarithm of the total assets at the end of 
each fiscal year 12.9633 1.9751 
Net interest 
margin NIM (%) 
Percentage of net interest income to average earnings 
assets 
3.0299 1.5233 
Bank capital CAPITAL (%) Percentage of total equity to total assets 29.4748 31.8152 
Board size BS Number of directors serving the board 10.5972 1.8172 
Independent 
directors INDEP (%) 
Percentage of independent directors to total number 
of directors on the board 42.9802 20.6383 
As regards the main variables of interest, the mean value of ETR indicates a mean tax charge of 15.62% for the 
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sample of 216 year ends observations. This rate is lower than the statutory rate applied which is equal to 35%. 
The average ETR of Tunisian banks indicates that statutory tax rates displayed by the government do not 
adequately reflect the nature of payment of taxes on Tunisian banks. Equally, we might note that ETR standard 
deviation is about 9.6% which highlights the dynamic nature of tax planning. 
The corporate governance related characteristics of the sample can be summarized as follows: the mean board 
size (BS) is ten directors with 43% being independent directors (INDEP). These values are similar to those 
reported in a recent Tunisian corporate governance study (Trabelsi 2010) with the exception of INDEP which 
was higher at 80%. 
4. Models Specification 
The initial regression incorporating the predictor variable (ETR) and related control variables is set out below 
with variables as defined in Table 2: 
ROAit = β0 + β1 ETRit + β2 SIZEit + β3 NIMit + β4 CAPITALit + εit (1) 
To assess the potentially impact of board structures on the tax planning performance the above regression is 
extended by including the two board related variables BS and INDEP. 
ROAit = β0 + β1 ETRit + β2 BSit + β3 INDEPit + β4 SIZEit + β5 NIMit + β6 CAPITALit + εit (2) 
A third regression tests whether the relationship between tax planning and bank performance is moderated by the 
banks’ board structures. In view of that, two moderating variables, ETR*BS and ETR*INDEP are constructed by 
multiplying tax planning measure by BS and INDEP variables respectively.  
ROAit = β0 + β1 ETRit + β2 BSit + β3 INDEPit + β4 ETRit * BSit + β5 ETRit * INDEPit + β6 SIZEit + β7 NIMit 
+ β8 CAPITALit + εit (3) 
To perform the study, we followed the method for identification of moderators proposed by Sharma et al. (1981). 
Specifically, we used a Moderated Regression Analysis (MRA) to examine whether the monitoring board affects 
the form of the relationship, and we used Subgroup Analysis to examine whether they influenced the strength 
(degree) of the relationship. The proposed framework consists of four steps discussed below: 
Step 1: Determine whether the hypothesized moderator variable interacts with the predictor using the MRA 
procedure (see equations 1, 2, 3). If there is a significant interaction, then proceed to step 2. Otherwise, go to step 
3.  
Step 2: Determine whether the moderator variable is a quasi or pure moderator by testing whether it is 
significantly correlated with the criterion variable (ROA). If it is, then it is a quasi moderator variable. If not, it is 
a pure moderator variable. Both quasi and pure moderators influence the form of the predictor-criterion 
relationship. 
Step 3: Determine if the hypothesized moderator is related to the criterion or predictor variable. If it is, it is not a 
moderator. If it is not related to either the predictor or criterion variable, proceed to step 4.  
Step 4: Split the total sample into subgroups on the basis of the suspected moderator and test of significance for 
differences in predictive validity across subgroups. If significant differences exist, the variable is a homologizer. 
Otherwise, it is not a moderator and the analysis is concluded. 
5. Results 
As described earlier, a series of regression models are intended to test for moderators of the form of the 
relationship between tax planning and bank performance. Before doing so, in our subsequent analysis we test the 
level of multicollinearity by using condition indices (Belsley et al. 1980). None of these indices exceeds the 
critical value of 30, the level at which multicollinearity may be a problem. 
The results reported in Table 3 are estimated with a fixed effects model which assumes that uncontrolled 
heterogeneity in firm specific factors are correlated with the included independent variables. We remedied this 
assumption through the use of a robust option for estimating the standard errors using the Huber-White sandwich 
estimators which control for heteroscedasticity (Petersen 2009).  
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Table 3. Regression Estimations 
Dependent variable : ROA Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
ETR -0.0343 -0.0281 -1.2471 
 (-1.38) (-1.23) (-2.35)** 
SIZE 0.5567 0.2145 0.8597 
 (1.38) (0.49) (1.19) 
NIM 0.8147 0.9191 1.1129 
 (1.14) (1.30) (1.58) 
CAPITAL -0.0535 -0.0996 -0.0616 
 (-0.52) (-0.87) (-0.75) 
BS  -0.7282 -2.0584 
  (-1.37) (-2.33)** 
INDEP  -0.0188 -0.0005 
  (-0.89) (-0.01) 
ETR*BS   0.1082 
   (2.48)** 
ETR*INDEP   -0.0006 
   (-0.35) 
Cons -4.0472 9.8579 14.1875 
 (-0.70) (1.04) (0.93) 
R2 (within) 0.0365 0.1108 0.3084 
N 216 216 216 
F value 5.58*** 6.07*** 6.33*** 
Hausman 18.76*** 28.29*** 47.64*** 
Figures in parentheses represent t-statistics. 
 ***, and ** indicate significance at 1% and 5% respectively. 
The first two models show a negative but not statistically significant relationship between tax planning measure 
and bank performance, ETR is not significantly different from zero. The control variables have non-significant 
coefficients which are robust to controlling for board monitors in model (2). We conclude that the relationship 
between ROA and ETR appears to be proxying for omitted banks specific characteristics, such as risk 
management.  
Though, caution should be exercised in interpreting these results. In model (3) the previously negative 
relationship between tax planning measure and bank performance holds, and now significant. In contrast to 
Abdul Wahab & Holland (2012), this result is not consistent with stakeholders concerns about risk in tax or other 
tax planning related risks, for example, the risk related to inspection or investigation by tax authorities. But it 
could be explained that banks are interested in tax planning in order to improve business performance (Minnick 
& Noga 2010). The negative significant coefficient with respect to BS is consistent with the Trabelsi (2010) 
finding within Tunisian banks suggesting that a high number of administrators results in a negative effect on 
performance.  
The next set of results examines whether the board of directors is a moderator of either the form or the strength 
of the relationship between tax planning and bank performance. The first step is to test whether our various 
moderator variables interacts with the predictor variable. In column (3) of Table (3), results suggest that BS in 
fact moderate the form of the tax planning-performance relationship; that is, board of directors' size appears to 
involve itself directly in the tax planning activities. A comparison of the R² for model (3) (30.84%) with that of 
model (2) (11.08%) is consistent with the moderating variable ETR*BS contributing a lot in terms of additional 
explanatory power.  
Interestingly, we do not find evidence that independent outside directors moderate the form of the tax planning-
performance relationship; that is, they do not appear to involve themselves directly in the tax planning activities 
decision-making. Subsequently, we test the possibility that such board members moderate the strength of that 
relationship. In order to do so we split the sample into subgroups of “low” and “high” groups of outside board 
members (Le et al. 2006). Banks were assigned into subgroups by reference to the median value of independent 
outside directors, which was 42%. We then regressed ETR along with our control variables on ROA for each 
subgroup. The results from the pooled regressions are reported in Table 4. 
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Table 4. Subgroup Analysis 
Dependent variable : ROA Outside board members 
“Low” group “High” group 
ETR -0.0062 -0.1933 
 (-0.63) (-3.54)*** 
SIZE -0.5296 1.3384 
 (-5.08)*** (3.02)*** 
NIM 0.1346 1.5116 
 (1.25) (3.64)*** 
CAPITAL 0.0032 0.2018 
 (0.20) (7.69)*** 
Cons 8.4727 21.1317 
 (4.74)*** (-3.32)*** 
N 114 102 
F value 39.28*** 27.70*** 
R2  0.5116 0.6722 
Difference in R2 0.1606*** 
Figures in parentheses represent t-statistics. 
 *** indicate significance at 1%. 
As chow in Table 4, the relationship between ETR and ROA proved to be statistically significantly negative for 
that subgroup consisting of banks with above-median independent outside board membership. For banks with 
low levels of outside board membership the ETR-ROA relationship was found to be insignificant. The ETR 
coefficients in the two subgroups do significantly differ from each other (result of test of significance is as 
follows: H0 -0.0062 = -0.1933 F = 11.40 p = 0.0009).  
A Chow test of the difference in R2 between the two models proved to be significant. These results suggest that 
independent outside board members moderate the strength, rather than the form of the relationship between tax 
planning and resulting bank performance. 
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